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    06.01.06

    The Suicide Pact, Part II: Malice Aforethought

    posted by Absinthe | 1:05 AM

    “I know what you’re going to do next. I’ve already played this fight in my head, a million times, from each and every angle… I won this fight before you even turned up.”
    – a geeky (yet badass) comic book by this guy

    And so here we are at the river, with ace high and a jack kicker, sitting out of position, either because the sandpapery player to our left threebet us preflop or because we called his button raise hoping to flop top pair and squeeze an extra turn bet out of him. The board looks absolutely harmless – rags, a pair, mostly uncoordinated – if he button-raised with 36o he could have a straight but the mathematics tell us he’s not quite that crazy. We made a play for the pot on the turn, checkraising with our ace high, and got called.

    What do we do?

    We all know that losing a bet is a minor mistake, while losing a pot – especially one of significant size that’s rightfully ours – is a catastrophe. We’re at the river here and we know that our hand is as good as it’s going to get, our outs are zero, and that our opponent will not possibly fold any hand that beats us. We also know that he will bet if we check, that he would bet with hands we can beat and hands we cannot, and that the size of the pot (8BB or thereabouts) practically requires that we call and hope our opponent rolls over king high or an ace we can beat. And the most aggravating thing is, we have the data to support the call – we’ll probably take the pot down at least one time in six. We have, quite literally, no choice in the matter, and the only thing we’re thinking as we stare at the clicky buttons is: How the fuck did we end up here again?

    Welcome back to the suicide pact.

    The most successful players in the limit games I play regularly (5/10 and 10/20) have adopted a very predictable, yet oddly impenetrable passive-aggressive algorithm of play. Raise first-in with an ever-broadening range of hands as the button approaches; raise limpers with a slightly narrower (but still broad) range of hands. KTo is plenty good to open from middle position; QJs, KJo or 33 is strong enough to “punish” limpers. Postflop, if checked to, bet on every street; if checkraised on flop or turn, call with any non-ignorant draw, ace or king high, or any pair (including an underpair so long as there is neither an ace nor a king on the board); reraise with two pair or better, or TPTK on a paint-rag-rag board. If checkraised on river, call with ace high or better, or even possibly king high. Against an opponent who will not relinquish the lead, call down with ace high or any pair.

    What this boils down to is, our opponent bets as if he has the best hand until someone suggests otherwise; if raised then he calls with any hand that has a remote chance of being good. This builds significant pots, which our opponent tries to steal through continued aggression, and for which he refuses to be outplayed. And, of course, sometimes he has the best hand.

    I’ve entertained a nearly limitless number of suggestions as to how to play against this type of player when out of position with a marginal hand. All of them are high-variance, many of them are stupid, and none of them are right all that often. Some are only good in the uber-long run. All of them are frustrating and can throw me off my game. Which raises the question: why bother?

    In my head (not a terribly pleasant place to live, though visiting it on occasion can be nice), this is the Grail, simply because this is the kind of opponent that stymies me most often as I find myself pursuing ever-thinner edges. It’s enough to give me hives. I’ve analyzed the problem any number of ways from my perspective to no avail – ABC poker isn’t providing a solution, tricky plays backfire way too often. Serious players reading this have already got to where this is going – against a predictable player, it’s their game you have to beat, and to do that you’ve got to know it from the inside out.

    So let’s get there. Our (by “our”, I mean “any bastard against whom I’m a net loser”) approach demands that we steal a lot of small pots; to maintain our ability to steal we must frequently bet with nothing. Queen high, an underpair. Whatever we decided to raise with. Savvy opponents (and there are always a few) will begin calling us down with nothing, but when this happens we will still win a reasonable share of pots at showdown in addition to the smaller ones we’re able to steal. But then our bolder opponents will begin raising us with nothing. We’re then forced to call them down with any hand that can beat any bluff because if we don’t our game falls apart, our bets and raises have no teeth. We’re like a shark – we can’t stop moving or we die. A paper shark.

    By refusing to be bluffed in position and staying on offense when possible, however, we never lose a pot we’re entitled to and we steal plenty that we’re not – and those stolen pots add up, the value of a raised pot stolen on the turn being a net of close to 2BB. If our opponents fold when they miss the flop and the turn (which will happen more than half the time), and only bet into us or checkraise the turn when they have a piece, the most that we’ll lose on any given hand is 4.5BB (and we’ll win a substantial number of those at showdown as well). If we successfully steal 40% of the pots we enter, and win just 40% of the hands we take to showdown, our play will show a profit – and that’s not including the extra bets we can squeeze out of our monsters, since the most likely opponent adaptation to our style is the overplay of marginal hands.

    So, then, how to make the shark stop moving? If someone can plainly see that I’m just overthinking this and I should retreat to rocklike play when faced with an opponent using this strategy – get out of their way unless I have absolutely solid values – by all means speak up and save me some writing and you some reading. Submissions of a mathematical nature suggesting that I’m full of shit will be given all due consideration. Otherwise, stay tuned for the conclusion, which I’ll post shortly after I finally wrap my head around the General Theory of Relativity – because that, I firmly believe, is where the answer lies.

    Popularity: 23% [?]

    Topics: Poker | 7 Comments »

    7 Responses to “The Suicide Pact, Part II: Malice Aforethought”

    1. DeadMoney Poker: The best poker blog posts from around the web Says:
      October 10, 2006 at 3:08 AM

      links from TechnoratiPlayed a goodly amount of poker this weekend, largely heads-up 10/20 LHE. Heads-up LHE is an odd game, if you’re both reasonably savvy. Ryan expressed it much better than I can in his Suicide Pact Posts I and II (and then conveniently abandoned the conclusion and left everyone hanging), but I’d forgotten the odd nature of heads-up/extremely shorthanded play. It often resolves itself into extremely aggressive action where the loser is the first person to blink,

    2. Pot Committed Says:
      June 7, 2006 at 8:42 AM

      links from Technorati $6K Guaranteed. I had a nice-sized stack at the final table and felt I was headed for a top three finish had my KK not been cracked by 33. Speaking of Ryan, please do your poker game a favor and check out his recent posts The Suicide Pact, Part I andPart II as well as No Good Deed. I’ve played a lot with Ryan and I’ve been sweated by him even more. He’s wicked smart, a helluva player and I can’t say enough about the good things he’s done for my game.

    3. PokerFilter.Net Says:
      June 6, 2006 at 4:58 PM

      links from Technoratidata to support the call – we’ll probably take the pot down at least one time in six. We have, quite literally, no choice in the matter, and the only thing we’re thinking as we stare at the clicky buttons is: How the fuck did we end up here again?Absinthetics » The Suicide Pact, Part II: Malice Aforethought

    4. Mark Says:
      June 1, 2006 at 11:55 AM

      Put me down in the “retreat to rocklike play” camp. I think there’s more risk than reward in the paper shark strategy — unless you’re an exceptional player. My impression is that dodging and weaving like the shark opens you up to the possibility of making mistakes that will cost more bets than they win.
      Also, it’s hard to be a winning player if you only win 40 percent of hands at showdown. I don’t think I’ve seen anyone who’s been able to pull it off.
      Good post — I’m looking forward to the General Theory of Relativity of Poker.

    5. Absinthe Says:
      June 1, 2006 at 1:27 PM

      My math on the subject goes roughly as follows: for every hundred pots you enter, you win forty without a showdown when your opponent makes nothing by the turn, netting about 80BB total. The remaining sixty pots that go to the river are larger, natch, with a net swing of slightly over 4BB each, so a potential of +-240BB. Win 40% of those hands at showdown and your net for “non-stolen” pots is -48BB, for a total pulled-out-of-ass EV of around +32BB.

      My assumptions may be absolutely insane, granted.

    6. dankhank Says:
      June 3, 2006 at 11:10 PM

      very good post. i don’t play limit poker much anymore, but your post was a great summary of the back and forth that goes on between expert players and tight mediocre players. in many ways it is a constant game of chicken involving the metagame factors you point out. imo the best solution is to retreat to rock-like state somewhat when oop, but to constantly be skating some sort of aggresive, slightly loose edge where opponents can’t tell whether you’re a shark, a trapper, or a nobody.

    7. Poor Tom Says:
      June 6, 2006 at 4:55 PM

      This comment = 2 cents..

      I think in your example you should probably bet the river with AJo, not check-call – not against a tight player (or someone so crazy loose you think there’s a great chance your hand is good and you want to induce a bet), but seeing as you think based on the evidence there’s a reasonable chance he’s been bluffing or on a busted draw, I think you’ve got bet out – you’ve got a decent chance of getting a fold and you’re planning on calling a bet anyway. Also I would probably try to make a play on the flop rather than the turn on that board, and I generally try to avoid playing AJo out of position as it’s too easily dominated..

      More generally I’m interested in your coming thoughts on playing v. a tightish, agressive sharky player. I’m not sure it’s really possible to make much money off the genuine sharks long term, but you might be able to break even with them or back them off you – I would think that rocking up is a bad idea if you want to get even with them or better, to do that you’d probably need to play as aggressively as them on marginal holdings when you’ve gone to the flop with them. But it’s probably better to focus on making your money off the other players anyway – the wusses and the maniacs.. that very aggressive game is definitely tough to play well (for me anyway), especially a good players, and it may well be better to just stay out of big hands with the sharks except with the nuts, and know you’re probably giving up some value overall.. but if the table is all sharks maybe you should move tables!

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